De Lima will not see what she doesn’t want to see

Justice Secretary Leila de Lima.

Justice Secretary Leila de Lima.

Now that the Department of Foreign Affairs’ willingness to downgrade the country’s claim to Sabah to strengthen its case against China before the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal has been exposed, it is resorting to the classic diversionary tactic- questioning the journalists’ motives in writing the report.

Justice Secretary Leila de Lima now comes to the aid of the DFA.

De Lima has been quoted in several reports as having said that VERA Files’ March 30 story “PH offers Sabah to win Malaysia’s support for UN case vs China” is a “misinterpretation.”

De Lima’s quotes: “I think it’s a misinterpretation to say that the Philippines is giving up on its claim on Sabah in exchange for Malaysia’s support against China. I didn’t read anything to that effect in the note verbale…

“It is only the DFA which can really confirm the content of the note verbale. So the motive of this misinformation is really puzzling…

“It’s a diplomatic matter. It concerns diplomatic relations and diplomatic relations are covered by confidentiality.”

I’m one of the trustees and writers of VERA Files and I resent De Lima’s casting aspersion on our reason for writing the story.

I’d like to borrow a quote from the eminent Salvador P. Lopez, writer, journalist, educator, diplomat, and statesman to answer De Lima: “ Basically, the journalist is required to inform the people – and to inform them correctly and consistently and (as is often demanded) courageously with the end in view of enabling the people to properly understand what goes on and impelling them to act on situations and problems more than as mere individuals but as a nation, a people in their behalf.”

Public interest was foremost in our mind when we decided to release the story despite an appeal from a high-ranking official not to.

For the information of De Lima, the Note Verbale was not classified as “confidential.”

Lawyer Romel Bagares, a former journalist, said public interest overrides whatever classification the DFA has stamped on the document. “ No easy and breathless assertion by government that the Note Verbale pertains to national security can cancel out its grave implications to the integrity of the national territory,” he said.

As to the De Lima’s statement that she read the Note Verbale in VERA Files website and “didn’t read anything to that effect,” I’m not really surprised.

She will not see what she doesn’t want to see.

It’s the DFA, now joined by DOJ, that are engaging in mis-information. Hence, I’m reprinting VERA Files statement released last week:

“The Department of Foreign Affairs is misleading the public when it says “Sabah is not in any way part of the note” verbale the Phililippine government sent recently to Malaysia in denying VERA Files’s story “PH offers Sabah to win Malaysia’s support for UN case vs China.”

“Note Verbale No. 15-1979 sent to Malaysia, the basis of VERA Files’ story, stated that it is reviewing the Aug. 4, 2009 protest (No. 000819) it filed with the United Nations. The Philippines’ August 2009 protest, contained in two pages, singles out North Borneo or the old name of Sabah.

“The Philippines took issue with an earlier joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia for the extended continental shelf because it “lays claims on areas that are disputed not only because they overlap with that of the Philippines, but also because of the controversy arising from the territorial claims on some of the islands in the area including North Borneo.”

“Contrary to what DFA’s comment that putting out the story was a disservice to the country, VERA Files released the story in the interest of the public to help it fully understand the issues involved. “

DFA is misleading public in Sabah for Spratlys issue

Disclosure: I am one of the trustees and writers of VERA Files, a group of veteran journalist who put out articles that take a deeper look at current issues.

Last Monday, VERA Files released a story, “PH offers Sabah to win Malaysia’s support for UN case vs China.
The article said, “ The quid pro quo was contained in a note verbale the Department of Foreign Affairs handed to a representative of the Malaysian Embassy last week, a week after the visit of Malaysian Defense Minister Dato Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein.

“The note verbale, a copy of which was obtained by VERA Files, referred to the May 6, 2009 joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in which Malaysia claimed an extended continental shelf (350 nautical miles from baseline) that was clearly projected from Sabah.

“The Philippines, in an Aug. 4, 2009 note to the U.N. Secretary General, protested the joint submission because it effectively declared Sabah to be a Malaysian territory…

“In last week’s note verbale, however, the DFA informed the Malaysian government that it is ‘reviewing’ its 2009 protest and its action would depend on Malaysia’s response to Manila’s two requests related to the South China Sea conflicting territorial claims.

“The first request is for Malaysia to ‘confirm’ that its claim of an extended continental shelf is ‘entirely from the mainland coast of Malaysia, and not from any of the maritime features in the Spratly islands.’
“The DFA also requested Malaysia to confirm that it ‘does not claim entitlement to maritime areas beyond 12 nautical miles from any of the maritime features in the Spratly islands it claims.’”

In reaction to the VERA Files’ report, DFA Spokesman Charles Jose released this statement:

“The Philippines has excellent relations with Malaysia. In the context of our friendly bilateral relations, our two countries have been for years exchanging ways on how to address the issue of the extended continental shelf (ECS) in the South China Sea.

“The Note Verbale that was written about was part of this process. The Note is about the features in the South China Sea and their implications on ECS claims. Sabah is not in any way part of the Note.”

Yesterday, VERA Files issued this statement:

The Department of Foreign Affairs is misleading the public when it says “Sabah is not in any way part of the note” verbale the Phililippine government sent recently to Malaysia in denying VERA Files’s story ‘PH offers Sabah to win Malaysia’s support for UN case vs China.”

Note Verbale No. 15-1979 sent to Malaysia, the basis of VERA Files’ story, stated that it is reviewing the Aug. 4, 2009 protest (No. 000819) it filed with the United Nations.The Philippines’ August 2009 protest, contained in two pages, singles out North Borneo or the old name of Sabah.

The Philippines took issue with an earlier joint submission by Indonesia and Malaysia for the extended continental shelf because it “lays claims on areas that are disputed not only because they overlap with that of the Philippines, but also because of the controversy arising from the territorial claims on some of the islands in the area including North Borneo.”

Contrary to what DFA’s comment that putting out the story was a disservice to the country, VERA Files released the story in the interest of the public to help it fully understand the issues involved.

Together with the March 15, 2015 Note Verbale, VERA Files released to media outfits the Philippine government’s August 2009 protest so the public would have concrete basis in evaluating the statements from government officials.

The documents can also be viewed in www.verafiles.org.
RP Protest to Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission_Page_1A
RP Protest to Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission_Page_2B

PH offers Sabah to win Malaysia’s support for UN case vs China

Sabah and Spratlys

Sabah and Spratlys


By Tessa Jamandre,VERA Files

The Philippines has offered to downgrade its claim on Sabah in exchange for Malaysia’s support for its case against China before the United Nations.

The quid pro quo was contained in a note verbale the Department of Foreign Affairs handed to a representative of the Malaysian Embassy last week, a week after the visit of Malaysian Defense Minister Dato Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein.

The note verbale, a copy of which was obtained by VERA Files, referred to the May 6, 2009 joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in which Malaysia claimed an extended continental shelf (350 nautical miles from baseline) that was clearly projected from Sabah.

The Philippines, in an Aug. 4, 2009 note to the U.N. Secretary General, protested the joint submission because it effectively declared Sabah to be a Malaysian territory.

The Philippines claims ownership of Sabah, which is at present occupied by Malaysia, based on the title of the Sultan of Sulu who ceded proprietary rights over the 76,115-square-kilometer land to the Philippines in 1962.
In last week’s note verbale, however, the DFA informed the Malaysian government that it is “reviewing” its 2009 protest and its action would depend on Malaysia’s response to Manila’s two requests related to the South China Sea conflicting territorial claims.

DFA comment issued March 30:

The Philippines has excellent relations with Malaysia. In the context of our friendly bilateral relations, our two countries have been for years exchanging ways on how to address the issue of the extended continental shelf (ECS) in the South China Sea.
The Note Verbale that was written about was part of this process. The Note is about the features in the South China Sea and their implications on ECS claims. Sabah is not in any way part of the Note.”

The first request is for Malaysia to “confirm” that its claim of an extended continental shelf is “entirely from the mainland coast of Malaysia, and not from any of the maritime features in the Spratly islands.”

The DFA also requested Malaysia to confirm that it “does not claim entitlement to maritime areas beyond 12 nautical miles from any of the maritime features in the Spratly islands it claims.”

Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a state is entitled to 12-nautical-mile territorial sea over which it exercises sovereignty.

Malaysia, like the Philippines, claims parts of the Spratly islands in the South China Sea which is being claimed almost wholly by China, Vietnam and Taiwan. Brunei is another claimant to some parts of the Spratlys.

There are some parts in the Spratlys where the 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zones of the Philippines and Malaysia overlap.

The DFA didn’t issue any statement when VERA Files sought its comment on the note verbale and its implications.
Former Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations Lauro Baja Jr. said the Philippine claim to Sabah will be “prejudiced” if Malaysia accedes to DFA’s request.

“We are in effect withdrawing our objection to Malaysia’s claim of ownership to Sabah,” he said.

A DFA official who requested anonymity, said, however, the Philippine claim to Sabah would remain intact even if Manila withdraws its 2009 objection to Malaysia’s submission to the U.N.

Baja countered, “Even if we are not formally dropping the Sabah claim, it (the withdrawal of the protest) can be used as evidence against our claim.”

A DFA source said officials involved in the case against China before the U.N. Arbitral Court said if Malaysia confirms it doesn’t claim beyond 12 nautical miles from any maritime features in the Spratlys Islands it claims, the Philippine case will be strengthened because one of Manila’s demands for relief from the U.N. court is to declare that certain features, such as rocks, do not generate maritime entitlement beyond 12 nautical miles.

This would clarify that the 12 nautical miles surrounding among others, the Panatag Shoal, also known as Scarborough Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc (Chinese name: Huangyan Island), are part of the Philippines 200-nautical-mile Economic Exclusive Zone.

The Philippines suit, which primarily sought to nullify China’s all-encompassing nine-dash line map invalid, also wants the U.N. court to rule that submerged features within and beyond 200 nautical miles of the Philippines are not part of China’s continental shelf. This would make China’s occupation of these features a violation of UNCLOS.

A diplomatic source said Malaysia may find the Philippine request “too hard to handle” because it has adopted the policy of “playing it safe”—expressing concern on China aggressiveness in the disputed waters while maintaining good relations with the economic superpower.

“A maritime entitlement of only 12 nautical miles for their reefs, as the essence of the Philippines request, will not be in the interest of Malaysia. Besides, Malaysia will not risk its close economic ties with China, its biggest trading partner,” the source said.

The source said China also protested the 2009 Malaysia-Vietnam submission to the U.N. So even if the Philippines withdrew its objection, the Chinese protest would stand, the source said.

The CLCS would not proceed on the Philippines’ withdrawal of its protest unless and until the Chinese 9-dash line claim is rendered invalid.

Also last week, the Philippines submitted a supplemental argument in answer to China’s position paper on the Spratlys territorial claim. The U.N. is expected to hand down its decision in 2016.

Meanwhile, the Philippines has denounced the massive reclamation of China on its occupied reefs.

Baja said the Philippine position on Sabah is much stronger than its Spratly islands claim. Economically, the timber and mineral-rich Sabah is much more valuable than Spratlys, he added.

There are more than 600,000 Filipinos in Sabah, most of them considered by Malaysia as illegal residents and are often subject to harassment.

Sabah (North Borneo) originally belonged to the Sultan of Brunei, who gave it to Sultan of Sulu Salah ud-Din Karamat Bakhtiar in 1658 as a reward for helping quell a rebellion. In 1878, Sulu Sultan Jamalul Alam Kiram leased North Borneo to the Hong Kong-based British North Borneo Co. of Baron Gustavos von Overbeck and Alfred Dent for 5,000 Malaysian dollars a year.

In 1946, Overbeck and Dent, without permission from the Sultan, transferred the territory to the British government when the company ceased operations.

On Sept. 11, 1962, Sultan of Sulu Mohammad Esmail Kiram ceded to the Philippine government full sovereignty, title and dominion over the territory. President Diosdado Macapagal filed the Philippines’ claim over Sabah with the United Nations.

In 1963, the British government, again without permission from the Sultan of Sulu, transferred Sabah to the newly formed Federation of Malaysia.

Malaysia is currently the broker in the peace talks between the Philippine government and the Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for the creation of a Bangsamoro, an autonomous political entity in the southern part of the Philippines.—with additional reports by Ellen Tordesillas

(VERA Files is put out by veteran journalists taking a deeper look at current issues. Vera is Latin for “true.”)
verafiles-dfa_note

Justice Carpio explains Itu Aba issue in the PH suit vs China

Itu Aba, also known as Taiping or Ligaw

Itu Aba, also known as Taiping or Ligaw

Last year, Itu Aba (also known as Taiping or Ligaw), the biggest feature in the Spratly group of islands being disputed by the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, figured in a controversy involving the appointment of the Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Justice Lourdes Sereno opposed the appointment of Jardeleza to the High Court accusing him of treason when he omitted Itu Aba in the Memorial or memorandum filed before the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal in connection with the case filed by the Philippine questioning the legality of China’s nine-dashed line map which overreaches into the territory of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

Itu Aba is occupied by Taiwan, once part of China but now considers itself a sovereign state as Republic of China. The Philippines adopts a One-China policy which considers Taiwan a province of China.

Jardeleza was of the view that including Itu Aba in the Memorial would weaken the Philippine case because the island has a water source and can sustain human habitation and therefore entitled to maritime regimes. That would be outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.

As a compromise by Jardeleza and the American lawyers handling the Philippine U.N. case, Itu Aba was included in the Memorial but it was not raised as a legal issue.

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

The High Court later cleared Jardeleza of the allegation of treason or disloyalty saying it was
“a legal strategy.”

Last Jan. 29, in a lecture at the Ateneo de Manila, Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio touched on Itu Aba.

He said the Philippines has a strong position in asserting ownership of Itu Aba: “Palawan has an area of 1,464,900 hectares, and a 650 KM coast facing the West Philippine Sea, while Itu Aba has an area of 46 hectares and a 1.4 KM coast. The relevant coast for Palawan is about 495 KM, while the relevant coast for Itu Aba is about 1 KM, or a ratio of 1:495 in favor of Palawan.

“The critical criterion is the length of the opposing coastlines in the overlapping maritime zones. Palawan is uniquely endowed by nature with an unusually long coastline – a total of more than 650 kilometers facing the West Philippines Sea. The combined coastline of all the Spratly Islands is minuscule compared to Palawan’s coastline.

“International law, international jurisprudence and nature itself have all combined to give the Philippines an impregnable position in this maritime dispute.”

If the U.N. Tribunal favors the Philippine government’s assertion that Itu Aba is not capable of human habitation or economic life of its own, Carpio said the tribunal will then declare that Palawan has a full 200 nautical mile Economic Exclusive Zone facing the West Philippine Sea.

“This means that all submerged features within this EEZ, like the Reed Bank and Malampaya, are subject to exclusive economic exploitation by the Philippines in terms of fisheries, oil and gas, and mineral resources,” he said.

Furthermore, he said, “If the Philippines has a full 200 NM EEZ in Palawan facing the West Philippine Sea, only the Philippines can create artificial islands on submerged areas or erect structures on LTEs (Low Tide Elevation) within its 200 NM EEZ. Artificial structures or reclamations made by other countries, namely by China and Vietnam, are illegal.”

Taiwan's Coast Guard officers stand on duty on Itu Aba (Taiping island). Sept 2011 photo. Taipei Times.

Taiwan’s Coast Guard officers stand on duty on Itu Aba (Taiping island). Sept 2011 photo. Taipei Times.

On the other hand, if the tribunal rules that Itu Aba is capable of human habitation or economic life of its own, Carpio said the case as far as Itu Aba and Palawan are concerned becomes an issue of overlapping EEZs, outside of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in view of China’s reservation excluding boundary delimitation issues from compulsory arbitration.

“In such a case, the tribunal will then refuse to proceed further except to declare that Itu Aba generates its own EEZ and that there is a boundary delimitation issue on overlapping EEZs between Palawan and Itu Aba. The tribunal has no jurisdiction over such boundary delimitation issue because China has opted out of compulsory jurisdiction over boundary delimitation issues, “he said.

What then would be the recourse of the Philippines?

Carpio said, “The recourse of the Philippines is to file a compulsory conciliation case against China to determine the maritime boundary between Itu Aba and Palawan in view of the overlapping EEZs. Compulsory conciliation is the specific remedy granted by UNCLOS against a member state that has opted out of compulsory arbitration on maritime boundary delimitation. While the decision of the compulsory conciliation commission is not binding, it has strong persuasive effect because it is a statement of what the international law is with respect to the particular dispute.”

How will the compulsory conciliation commission resolve the overlap issue?

Taiwan builds a 1,150- meter wharf in Itu Aba. From Flickr

Taiwan builds a 1,150- meter wharf in Itu Aba. From Flickr

Carpio said, “The distance between Palawan and Itu Aba is 225 NM. Palawan has a 495 KM coastline facing Itu Aba while Itu Aba has only a 1 KM coastline facing Palawan. These opposing coastlines, when projected to seaward, create the overlapping zones.

“The ratio of the length of the relevant coasts is 1:495 in favor of Palawan, showing not only a substantial disparity, but an overwhelming disparity. “

Carpio further explained: “Applying the UNCLOS ‘equitable solution’ principle (no disproportionate allocation of the relevant maritime area between islands with unequal coastlines), Palawan will be allocated a full 200 NM EEZ facing Itu Aba, and Itu Aba will be given the balance of 25 NM as follows: 13 NM EEZ and 12 NM territorial sea facing Palawan. Itu Aba will also have an EEZ facing seaward up to where Vietnam’s EEZ ends.

“Since Palawan can also claim an ECS (Extended Continental Shelf) beyond its 200-NM EEZ, there is an overlap between Palawan’s ECS and Itu Aba’s EEZ. This overlap, called the ‘grey area,’ will be delimited by the compulsory conciliation commission also in accordance with the “equitable solution” principle applied in the delimitation of the overlapping EEZs. Itu Aba will be entitled only to the living resources in its 13-NM EEZ facing Palawan. The non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil within Itu Aba’s 13-NM EEZ facing Palawan will belong to Palawan’s ECS

“Itu Aba will have an EEZ seaward to the South China Sea up to where Vietnam’s EEZ ends. However, the non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil, up to 70 NM (median line between outer limits of Vietnam’s and the Philippines’ EEZs) measured from the outer limit of Palawan’s EEZ, excluding the territorial sea of Itu Aba, will form part of Palawan’s ECS.

“In short, the Philippines is entitled to the oil, gas, minerals and sedentary species in the grey area seaward of Itu Aba – the overlap between Itu Aba’s EEZ and Palawan’s ECS beyond the 200 NM EEZ of Palawan.

“This is the ‘condominium’” solution applied to the ‘grey area.’”

Justice Carpio explains Itu Aba issue in the PH suit vs China

Itu Aba, also known as Taiping or Ligaw

Itu Aba, also known as Taiping or Ligaw

Last year, Itu Aba (also known as Taiping or Ligaw), the biggest feature in the Spratly group of islands being disputed by the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, figured in a controversy involving the appointment of the Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Justice Lourdes Sereno opposed the appointment of Jardeleza to the High Court accusing him of treason when he omitted Itu Aba in the Memorial or memorandum filed before the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal in connection with the case filed by the Philippine questioning the legality of China’s nine-dashed line map which overreaches into the territory of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

Itu Aba is occupied by Taiwan, once part of China but now considers itself a sovereign state as Republic of China. The Philippines adopts a One-China policy which considers Taiwan a province of China.

Jardeleza was of the view that including Itu Aba in the Memorial would weaken the Philippine case because the island has a water source and can sustain human habitation and therefore entitled to maritime regimes. That would be outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.

As a compromise by Jardeleza and the American lawyers handling the Philippine U.N. case, Itu Aba was included in the Memorial but it was not raised as a legal issue.

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

The High Court later cleared Jardeleza of the allegation of treason or disloyalty saying it was
“a legal strategy.”

Last Jan. 29, in a lecture at the Ateneo de Manila, Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio touched on Itu Aba.

He said the Philippines has a strong position in asserting ownership of Itu Aba: “Palawan has an area of 1,464,900 hectares, and a 650 KM coast facing the West Philippine Sea, while Itu Aba has an area of 46 hectares and a 1.4 KM coast. The relevant coast for Palawan is about 495 KM, while the relevant coast for Itu Aba is about 1 KM, or a ratio of 1:495 in favor of Palawan.

“The critical criterion is the length of the opposing coastlines in the overlapping maritime zones. Palawan is uniquely endowed by nature with an unusually long coastline – a total of more than 650 kilometers facing the West Philippines Sea. The combined coastline of all the Spratly Islands is minuscule compared to Palawan’s coastline.

“International law, international jurisprudence and nature itself have all combined to give the Philippines an impregnable position in this maritime dispute.”

If the U.N. Tribunal favors the Philippine government’s assertion that Itu Aba is not capable of human habitation or economic life of its own, Carpio said the tribunal will then declare that Palawan has a full 200 nautical mile Economic Exclusive Zone facing the West Philippine Sea.

“This means that all submerged features within this EEZ, like the Reed Bank and Malampaya, are subject to exclusive economic exploitation by the Philippines in terms of fisheries, oil and gas, and mineral resources,” he said.

Furthermore, he said, “If the Philippines has a full 200 NM EEZ in Palawan facing the West Philippine Sea, only the Philippines can create artificial islands on submerged areas or erect structures on LTEs (Low Tide Elevation) within its 200 NM EEZ. Artificial structures or reclamations made by other countries, namely by China and Vietnam, are illegal.”

Taiwan's Coast Guard officers stand on duty on Itu Aba (Taiping island). Sept 2011 photo. Taipei Times.

Taiwan’s Coast Guard officers stand on duty on Itu Aba (Taiping island). Sept 2011 photo. Taipei Times.

On the other hand, if the tribunal rules that Itu Aba is capable of human habitation or economic life of its own, Carpio said the case as far as Itu Aba and Palawan are concerned becomes an issue of overlapping EEZs, outside of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in view of China’s reservation excluding boundary delimitation issues from compulsory arbitration.

“In such a case, the tribunal will then refuse to proceed further except to declare that Itu Aba generates its own EEZ and that there is a boundary delimitation issue on overlapping EEZs between Palawan and Itu Aba. The tribunal has no jurisdiction over such boundary delimitation issue because China has opted out of compulsory jurisdiction over boundary delimitation issues, “he said.

What then would be the recourse of the Philippines?

Carpio said, “The recourse of the Philippines is to file a compulsory conciliation case against China to determine the maritime boundary between Itu Aba and Palawan in view of the overlapping EEZs. Compulsory conciliation is the specific remedy granted by UNCLOS against a member state that has opted out of compulsory arbitration on maritime boundary delimitation. While the decision of the compulsory conciliation commission is not binding, it has strong persuasive effect because it is a statement of what the international law is with respect to the particular dispute.”

How will the compulsory conciliation commission resolve the overlap issue?

Taiwan builds a 1,150- meter wharf in Itu Aba. From Flickr

Taiwan builds a 1,150- meter wharf in Itu Aba. From Flickr

Carpio said, “The distance between Palawan and Itu Aba is 225 NM. Palawan has a 495 KM coastline facing Itu Aba while Itu Aba has only a 1 KM coastline facing Palawan. These opposing coastlines, when projected to seaward, create the overlapping zones.

“The ratio of the length of the relevant coasts is 1:495 in favor of Palawan, showing not only a substantial disparity, but an overwhelming disparity. “

Carpio further explained: “Applying the UNCLOS ‘equitable solution’ principle (no disproportionate allocation of the relevant maritime area between islands with unequal coastlines), Palawan will be allocated a full 200 NM EEZ facing Itu Aba, and Itu Aba will be given the balance of 25 NM as follows: 13 NM EEZ and 12 NM territorial sea facing Palawan. Itu Aba will also have an EEZ facing seaward up to where Vietnam’s EEZ ends.

“Since Palawan can also claim an ECS (Extended Continental Shelf) beyond its 200-NM EEZ, there is an overlap between Palawan’s ECS and Itu Aba’s EEZ. This overlap, called the ‘grey area,’ will be delimited by the compulsory conciliation commission also in accordance with the “equitable solution” principle applied in the delimitation of the overlapping EEZs. Itu Aba will be entitled only to the living resources in its 13-NM EEZ facing Palawan. The non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil within Itu Aba’s 13-NM EEZ facing Palawan will belong to Palawan’s ECS

“Itu Aba will have an EEZ seaward to the South China Sea up to where Vietnam’s EEZ ends. However, the non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil, up to 70 NM (median line between outer limits of Vietnam’s and the Philippines’ EEZs) measured from the outer limit of Palawan’s EEZ, excluding the territorial sea of Itu Aba, will form part of Palawan’s ECS.

“In short, the Philippines is entitled to the oil, gas, minerals and sedentary species in the grey area seaward of Itu Aba – the overlap between Itu Aba’s EEZ and Palawan’s ECS beyond the 200 NM EEZ of Palawan.

“This is the ‘condominium’” solution applied to the ‘grey area.’”