PH authorities knew of Subi Reef lighthouse construction 5 years ago

Lighthouse on Subi Reef in South China Sea is not in use. Photo by Xing Guangli. Xinhua

Lighthouse on Subi Reef in South China Sea is not in use. Photo by Xing Guangli. Xinhua

China has started the operations of a lighthouse in Subi Reef, The Chinese news agency Xinhua reported Tuesday.

Xinhua said the 55-meter high lighthouse contains technology to monitor passing ships.

The Philippines should be very concerned.

Subi Reef is the nearest China- occupied feature in the disputed Spratlys to the Philippine-occupied Pag-asa island. Only 12 nautical miles of the sea separate the two features claimed not only by China and the Philippines but also Vietnam.

Subi is Zamora Reef to the Philippines, Zhǔbì Jiāo to China and đá Xu Bi to Vietnam. Pag-asa is also known as Thitu, Zhōngyè Dǎo to China and Đảo Thị Tứ to Vietnam.

As warned by Magdalo Rep. Ashley Acedillo in May last year, the reclamations and construction of military facilities in Subi Reef and Mischief Reef are intended to choke off access to Ayungin shoal, where the Philippines maintains a military outpost in a rusty WWII warship beached there, the BRP Sierra Madre.

It was also near Subi Reef where the U.S. guided missile destroyer the USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles October last year in its Freedom of Navigation assertion.

The lighthouse in Subi Reef is China’s third in Spratlys. The two others are in Huayang (Calderon Reef ) Reef and Chigua (Johnson South)Reef.

The Aquino government, which expects the decision of the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal on its case filed versus China on the latter’s nine-dashed line map, has not been reported to have filed a protest on China’s Subi Reef lighthouse.

It’s disturbing and infuriating. Philippine authorities knew about the construction of the lighthouse in Subi Reef as early as far back as 2010.

Here’s a report by VERA Files’ Tessa Jamandre titled “China builds lighthouse on PHL-claimed territory in Spratlys”:

“China has constructed a lighthouse on Subi Reef in the disputed areas in the South China Sea which Chinese troops are occupying but is being claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam.

“Aerial shots taken in October by the Philippine Air Force on routine reconnaissance flights show the 20-by-20-meter structure complemented by parabolic antennas and domes on the reef, which the Philippine government calls “Zamora” and lies only 26 kilometers southwest of Pag-asa that is part of Kalayaan town.

“The lighthouse is intended to expand and fortify China’s claim over the hotly contested Spratly group of islands, experts said.
“Under international law, a lighthouse is a recognized base point from where a state can measure its maritime regimes, including territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the baseline), contiguous zone (24 nm), economic exclusive zone (200 nm), continental shelf (200 nm) and extended continental shelf (350nm).

“Malacañang and the Department of Foreign Affairs declined to comment on the information when asked for their reaction. An official, who asked not to be named, said they would like to see first the published article.

““I think that should be resisted. That really goes against all understandings,” said former ambassador to Japan Domingo Siazon who was the foreign secretary in 1995 when the Philippines strongly protested the construction by China of military-type structures on Mischief Reef, 150 miles west of Palawan and 620 miles southeast of China.”

Malacanang and the DFA remained silent and did not protest after the publication of VERA Files’ article.

Is it any wonder that China proceeded with the construction without any trouble?

Water source crucial in determining status of Itu Aba (1)

Itu Aba. Photo by AMTI.CSIS.org

Itu Aba. Photo by AMTI.CSIS.org


Is the water coming from the grounds of Itu Aba (Chinese name: Taiping; Philippine name: Ligaw) suitable for drinking?
The answer to this question is crucial in determining whether Itu Aba is an island or a rock.

The determination of Itu Aba’s feature- whether a rock or an island- is important in establishing the extent of the Philippine’s territory and coverage of its sovereignty.

Itu Aba, occupied by Taiwan, is the biggest feature in the Spratlys in South China Sea which is being claimed wholly by China and Taiwan and partly by Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS defines an island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”

An island is entitled to maritime regimes similar to a land territory: territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the baseline), contiguous zone (24 nm), economic exclusive zone (200 nm), continental shelf (200 nm) and extended continental shelf (350nm).
On the other hand, “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf,” according to UNCLOS.

The issue of whether Itu Aba is a rock or an island has again come to the fore with the visit of Taiwan’s outgoing President Ma Ying-jeou there last Jan. 28.

In his speech addressing the troops stationed in Itu Aba, Ma voiced his resentment that Taiwan had been ignored in the arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China before the U.N Arbitral Tribunal when Itu Aba was included among the Spratlys features being contested.

Ma said:“The Philippines sought arbitration with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013 concerning competing claims with mainland China vis-à-vis the South China Sea. This arbitration is of particular importance to our country, yet we have not been invited to participate, nor has our opinion on the matter been sought. “

Foreign Affairs officials explained that the Philippines has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan because it adheres to the One China policy, which recognizes the Beijing government as representative to the Chinese people. The People’s Republic of China considers Taiwan as its province. The Philippines’ relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), robust as it is, is limited to “people to people.” Political exchanges with Taiwan are banned under the One- China policy.

Moreover, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations.

In his speech, Ma talked lengthily about Itu Aba or Taiping’s capability to sustain human habitation.

President Ma Ying-jeou  visits Itu Aba

President Ma Ying-jeou visits Itu Aba

He said: “The Philippines holds that Taiping Island has no freshwater, and no arable soil, claiming that food and water must all be imported and human habitation is impossible. This, the Philippines says, means that it is not an island, but a rock, to which no claim can be made on territorial waters beyond 12 nautical miles. However, such statements find no basis in either science or fact; they are totally wrong. The economic, environmental, and cultural realms all provide evidence sufficient to show that the island has—and has had for over 100 years—ample resources to be self-sufficient.

“Geological study of the island shows that Taiping Island was formed perhaps 3 million years ago. Roughly 20,000 years ago, it rose upward to 100 meters above sea level. Perhaps this sheds light on why Taiping Island became the only island in the Nanshas to have its own sources of potable water.

“Annual rainfall on Taiping Island is roughly 3,000 mm. Rainwater is either trapped by the soil or seeps down into the coral below. The coral layer further down, having been there for a million years, has been lithified and become impervious to water, meaning that the island has a rich supply of groundwater. Water from the best well, the No. 5 well, has been tested by experts and found to be close to that marketed internationally under the brand name Evian in terms of conductivity and total dissolved solids. It can be drunk directly, and tastes as good as mineral water sold in stores.

“Historical documentary evidence attests to the presence of freshwater on the island. The earliest appearance of such documents is in 1879, with the Royal Navy’s The China Sea Directory, in which it attests to the use of Taiping Island by Chinese fishermen and the presence of wells, of which it states, ‘The water found in the well on that island was better than elsewhere.’

“ In 1939, a survey report on Taiping Island by a technician working at Taichu Prefecture (today’s Taichung City, Changhua County, and Nantou County) states that ‘the island has abundant potable water, sufficient for both fishing vessels and for use on the island itself.’

“ In 1946, a report written during a survey of the Nansha Islands by an ROC naval flotilla states that ‘there are several wells on the island, the water drawn from which is excellent.’ In 1994, the Council of Agriculture, in ‘Nanhai Shengtai Huanjing Diaocha Yanjiu Baogao,’ a report on the ecology of the South China Sea, states that the freshwater at two places on Taiping Island is of better quality than that found in most rivers or lakes. The Coast Guard Administration, meanwhile, last December released ‘Living Conditions on Taiping Island,’ which states that of the four wells on the island, the water of one is used to raise tilapia, while the other three can provide 65 tons of freshwater daily, and that on the average freshwater accounts for 92 percent of water drawn from these wells. Water drawn from Well No. 5, meanwhile, is 99 percent freshwater of good quality. History thus attests to the plenitude and quality of freshwater on Taiping Island, sufficient to support human life.”

In the hearing of Arbitral Tribunal on the Philippine suit against China in The Hague November last year, the Philippine panel presented an expert who testified that there is no freshwater in Itu Aba and cannot sustain human habitation. Therefore, it is a rock.

We will discuss this in the next column.

UN Arbitral Panel Rules In Favor of the Philippines: Now What?

Former Foreign Secretary Roberto R. Romulo

Former Foreign Secretary Roberto R. Romulo

By Roberto R. Romulo

Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario’s dogged determination to pursue the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea dispute through the rule of law has proven his approach correct. The court ruled that the case was “properly constituted” under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that China’s “non-appearance” (i.e., refusal to participate) did not preclude the Court’s jurisdiction, and that the Philippines was within its rights in filing the case.

In the period before the ruling, there was a lot of pressure on the Secretary to dial down his stance and seek accommodation with China. While China has insisted on resolving the issue on a bilateral basis, the Secretary has maintained that this would leave us at a disadvantage and that in the instances where we tried to open dialogue, China has been unresponsive. That said, now that our hand has been strengthened, the argument in favour of the merits of seeking a peaceful, managed resolution has I think become even more persuasive. However, the responsibility of how to respond to this challenge will now have to be made by the incoming Administration. Unfortunately, the sounds currently coming from presidential aspirants or supporters of the aspirants reveal a misunderstanding of what the case is all about, claiming victory for our sovereign rights over the area. They have to get up to speed on the issue and determine the best way forward to protect the national interest rather than engaging in just nationalistic rhetoric.

There is still a long way to go and it is possible that the Court may ultimately find no merit in or no jurisdiction over a number of Philippine assertions. But it is true that it is a major boost to our effort to resolve the dispute through the application of the rule of law. Some observers do say that the determination of jurisdiction phase was the most vulnerable to political and diplomatic pressure. The members of the Court could have bailed out by saying that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because for example, it touches on sovereignty issues. But in fact the Court voted unanimously as the case “concerns only whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ claims and whether such claims are admissible.”

Our 4,000 page Memorial however was cleverly constructed to limit the assertions to the interpretation of international law, principally UNCLOS, and not directly on the question of sovereignty. Now, the merits of the case will be decided on the basis of internationally established rules and precedents. The legal experts are convinced we have a strong case. At the very least it would ensure that, even without China’s participation, the merits of its 9-dash line (which is the basis of its claim of sovereignty) will be evaluated by a neutral international body. China has managed to avoid explaining the logic behind the 9-dash line by taking a position of “strategic ambiguity” – laying claim to a wide expanse of waters and mostly submerged reefs and rocks on the basis of historical rights. They deliberately ignore the question of whether these reefs and rocks meet the UNCLOS criteria for generating territorial waters and even more so, an EEZ. Under UNCLOS, only naturally formed islands and islets of certain elevation at high tide are capable of generating territorial waters and only islands capable of supporting permanent human habitation can generate both territorial sea and EEZ.

Now the entire South China Sea is about 3.5 million square kilometres but the total land area of all islands and features is only 15 square kilometers at low tide. Simple math would suggest that this would in no way give China the right to claim ownership of the entire area, even if in the unlikely event that its sovereignty claim over these land features is upheld. In fact, the Philippine position is that if the 9 dash line has no basis in international law, then China does not have a basis for laying claim to sovereignty over completely submerged areas, or historic rights to living and non-living natural resources, including control of maritime navigation.”

The incoming Administration would have several factors in its favour as it seeks to find a peaceful resolution. First, the dispute has been internationalized. China’s disregard of the legal avenue for resolution and its aggressive reclamation has drawn reprobation. Even the normally neutral ASEAN countries have become unsettled by China’s actions and have expressed their disapproval..

Ironically, the ruling may have a salutary effect on the prospects for a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea which had long languished on account of China’s delaying tactics. The Court has rejected an argument in China’s position paper that the “2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea constitutes an agreement to resolve disputes relating to the South China Sea exclusively through negotiation.” The Court has decided that the Declaration on Conduct was a “political agreement that was not intended to be legally binding”. So now even China might find this a more palatable forum than one that involves non-ASEAN parties. Secondly, the U.S. has taken an active involvement in the dispute by sending its Navy ships to test China’s assurance of freedom of navigation and at the same time probing the lengths to which China is prepared to justify its 9-dash line boundary. Thirdly, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines have found common ground on this issue and opens up wide areas for cooperation.

But while these pressure points might encourage China to moderate its aggressive stance, it is its internal situation that would determine how much flexibility it would have. President Xi Jin Ping is still consolidating his hold and cannot afford to appear soft. He is also facing the challenge of a slowing Chinese economy as it transition from dependency on exports and investments to a more balanced and sustainable model where domestic consumption is a key component. The Chinese people’s nationalism can easily be stoked by recalling its long history of colonial subjugation and invoking its rightful place in the world for its remarkable achievements.

July 2015 hearing at the Peace Palace, The Hague

July 2015 hearing at the Peace Palace, The Hague

China has already said it will not honor the outcome of the arbitration. Nor should we expect them to. Any resolution to this long festering issue will have to take into account China’s interests as well and provide “face” to the Leadership. The fact that China’s Leaders will be dealing with a new Philippine Leader would allow both to dial down from their current stand-off without losing face. The adoption of a binding Code of Conduct would go a long way in keeping the status quo.

Then both sides can then buckle down to the most difficult issue. I believe that sharing resources that can be found in the area is the easier dilemma to deal with than the issue of who should guarantee freedom of navigation in this vital waterway. Since the U.S. does not trust China and China in turn does not trust the U.S. can ASEAN take that role? These are just some of the issues that our Presidential aspirants should be thinking of now. The Court will render its ruling in 2016 and this is one of major challenge that our new President will have to confront upon his assumption to the highest position of the land. The buck stops there.
One last point: China should realize that this issue is not just between the US and China but one that strikes at the heart of developing smaller countries of ASEAN countries which, with China struggled to be respected by world powers in constructing a new world order after the last world war where big and small , new and old countries are treated as equals.

(Roberto R. Romulo was Secretary of Foreign Affairs from July 1992 to May 1995. This commentary first came out in Philippine Star.)

Why the Philippines did not build lighthouses in Spratlys

Long before China built lighthouses in reefs they are occupying in the disputed Spratlys, the Philippine government under President Fidel Ramos had planned to build lighthouses in Reed Bank and two other reefs but inter-government wrangling over money stalled the project until it was overtaken by events.

Last Tuesday, China announced its plan to construct lighthouses in two reefs in Spratlys which it calls Nansha Islands.

Groundbreaking ceremony for the construcion of Lighthouses in Huayang Reef and Chigua Reef. Xinhua photo.

Groundbreaking ceremony for the construcion of Lighthouses in Huayang Reef and Chigua Reef. Xinhua photo.

A news item in Xinhua, a Chinese news agency, China to Build Large Lighthouses in South China Sea said, “China’s Ministry of Transport (MOT) on Tuesday hosted a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of two lighthouses on Huayang Reef and Chigua Reef of China’s Nansha Islands.

“In order to enhance the civil aids to navigation capacity in the waters of Nansha Islands, the MOT plans to construct two multi-functional lighthouses, which will provide efficient navigation service to the passing vessels and “immensely improve the navigation safety” in the South China Sea, according to a statement from the MOT.

“Integrated with elements of traditional Chinese culture, the two 50-meter-high lighthouses, with lanterns of 4.5 meters in diameter, are designed to have a light range of 22 nautical miles.

“The South China Sea is an important international maritime transport route as well as a major fishing ground. A large number of fishing vessels operate in this area all year round, which has led to many maritime traffic accidents.

“Lighthouses are vital public facilities for navigation safety, and are usually constructed at key ports and critical positions of waterways to provide navigation service for vessels or indicate dangerous areas through refraction from the lens on the top.”

Pictures of the groundbreaking ceremony on Huayang Reef (Philippines name: Cuarteron) were posted in Xinhua’s website.

The lighthouses are additional facilities in the reefs where China has been doing massive reclamation and construction of what looks like military installations. Chigua Reef’s Philippine name is Mabini Reef. It is also known as Johnson South Reef.

South China Sea observers say the lighthouses could be another way of China’s circumventing the United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea Provision (UNCLOS) that baselines could be drawn from low tide elevations or LTE (naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide) if there are lighthouses or similar installations built on them.

Former Ambassdor Alberto Encomienda, now the executive director of Balik Balangay, a non-stock, non-profit conservation organization focusing on the marine environment and resources, said that UNCLOS provision applies only to naturally- formed features. What Cuarteron and Mabini Reefs now are artificial islands.

Lawyer Harry Roque also said the UNCLOS provision on lighthouses on LTEs applies only to archipelagic states (State or country that comprises a series of islands that form an archipelago.) which China is not.

The Philippines is an archipelagic state. Documents obtained by Vera Files showed that as early as 1994, Ramos ordered various agencies to work together on projects to redefine the country’s archipelagic baseline.

Documents obtained by Vera Files showed that as early as 1994, Ramos ordered various agencies to work together on projects to redefine the country’s archipelagic baseline.

In mid-1994, then Administrator Jose Solis of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority) sought financial assistance from then Energy Secretary Delfin Lazaro for the building of lighthouses on three islets in the KIG: Nares Reef, Recto Bank or Marie Louise Reef, and Sea Horse Bank.

This was about the time that the Chinese were starting to occupy Mischief Reef in the KIG, which is only 135 nautical miles away from the Philippine baseline. The Philippine government authorities found out about it in February 1995.

Lazaro supported the lighthouses project and sought Ramos’ approval to draw funds from the DOE’s Special Account.

In a memo to Ramos, Lazaro cited possible international complications and risks of the lighthouse project: “While this project will be beneficial to the Philippines in terms of expanding available area not only for petroleum exploration but for other natural resources as well and that the lighthouses will also be important navigational aids, we wish to point out that actual construction of the lighthouse could provoke international protests from other countries (such as China and Vietnam) including possible physical stoppage of the work by their navies.”

Lazaro’s request for a go-signal got stalled in Malacanang. His successor, Francisco Viray, pursued the lighthouse project. In a memo to Ramos dated Dec. 12, 1994, Viray said: “Once established, these lighthouses will serve as legal basis in determining the new baseline. Other countries are doing the same things to fortify their territorial claims.”

Viray said the presence of lighthouses would reinforce the country’s claim over the Reed Bank. A lighthouse would have qualified Reed Bank, which is within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, to be part of the archipelagic baseline.

“The inclusion of the Reed Bank within the baselines will effectively increase our archipelagic waters within the baselines by 11,042 square nautical miles or 7,750,000 hectares. This will mean that we can fully exercise sovereignty over this resource-rich area. It must be noted that the inclusion of this area within the EEZ only does not assure full exploration/exploitation rights. Under UNCLOS, other countries can come in as long as they pay royalties,” Viray said.

Documents showed that on Feb. 15, 1995, Ramos finally approved the release of P178-million for the mapping, survey, and construction of lighthouses in the KIG. He instructed the DOE to supply the funds, and the NAMRIA to supervise the design and construction of the lighthouse as well as the coordinates of the benchmarks identifying the territorial limits based on the 200-nautical mile EEZ. Formal public bidding was waived “in view of the urgency and confidentiality of the project.”

But soon after the funding was approved, Ramos himself revoked the authority of NAMRIA, which is under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to oversee the project and transferred it to the Philippine Navy upon the recommendation of Defense Secretary Renato de Villa.

This led Solis to complain in a June 6, 1995 memo to then Environment Secretary Angel G. Alcala: “The NAMRIA has been religiously working for the immediate implementation of the KIG project. I would like to inform the Executive Secretary that when there were still no available funds for the project, it was the NAMRIA which did all the work to convince the funding agency to support the project. However, when the funding was approved and the authority was given to the NAMRIA, the Cabinet made a decision to transfer the project to the Philippine Navy.”

The KIG lighthouses never got built—and the Philippines has lost its chance to build them.

By the time Solis wrote Alcala, the Chinese garrison was already discovered in Mischief Reef (February 1995). Philippine protest over Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef led to an ASEAN Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which enjoins “ Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”

The Philippines is protesting the building by China of lighthouses in the disputed reefs as a violation of the ASEAN DOC. That’s all that we can do.

Why the Philippines did not build lighthouses in Spratlys

Long before China built lighthouses in reefs they are occupying in the disputed Spratlys, the Philippine government under President Fidel Ramos had planned to build lighthouses in Reed Bank and two other reefs but inter-government wrangling over money stalled the project until it was overtaken by events.

Last Tuesday, China announced its plan to construct lighthouses in two reefs in Spratlys which it calls Nansha Islands.

Groundbreaking ceremony for the construcion of Lighthouses in Huayang Reef and Chigua Reef. Xinhua photo.

Groundbreaking ceremony for the construcion of Lighthouses in Huayang Reef and Chigua Reef. Xinhua photo.

A news item in Xinhua, a Chinese news agency, China to Build Large Lighthouses in South China Sea said, “China’s Ministry of Transport (MOT) on Tuesday hosted a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of two lighthouses on Huayang Reef and Chigua Reef of China’s Nansha Islands.

“In order to enhance the civil aids to navigation capacity in the waters of Nansha Islands, the MOT plans to construct two multi-functional lighthouses, which will provide efficient navigation service to the passing vessels and “immensely improve the navigation safety” in the South China Sea, according to a statement from the MOT.

“Integrated with elements of traditional Chinese culture, the two 50-meter-high lighthouses, with lanterns of 4.5 meters in diameter, are designed to have a light range of 22 nautical miles.

“The South China Sea is an important international maritime transport route as well as a major fishing ground. A large number of fishing vessels operate in this area all year round, which has led to many maritime traffic accidents.

“Lighthouses are vital public facilities for navigation safety, and are usually constructed at key ports and critical positions of waterways to provide navigation service for vessels or indicate dangerous areas through refraction from the lens on the top.”

Pictures of the groundbreaking ceremony on Huayang Reef (Philippines name: Cuarteron) were posted in Xinhua’s website.

The lighthouses are additional facilities in the reefs where China has been doing massive reclamation and construction of what looks like military installations. Chigua Reef’s Philippine name is Mabini Reef. It is also known as Johnson South Reef.

South China Sea observers say the lighthouses could be another way of China’s circumventing the United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea Provision (UNCLOS) that baselines could be drawn from low tide elevations or LTE (naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide) if there are lighthouses or similar installations built on them.

Former Ambassdor Alberto Encomienda, now the executive director of Balik Balangay, a non-stock, non-profit conservation organization focusing on the marine environment and resources, said that UNCLOS provision applies only to naturally- formed features. What Cuarteron and Mabini Reefs now are artificial islands.

Lawyer Harry Roque also said the UNCLOS provision on lighthouses on LTEs applies only to archipelagic states (State or country that comprises a series of islands that form an archipelago.) which China is not.

The Philippines is an archipelagic state. Documents obtained by Vera Files showed that as early as 1994, Ramos ordered various agencies to work together on projects to redefine the country’s archipelagic baseline.

Documents obtained by Vera Files showed that as early as 1994, Ramos ordered various agencies to work together on projects to redefine the country’s archipelagic baseline.

In mid-1994, then Administrator Jose Solis of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority) sought financial assistance from then Energy Secretary Delfin Lazaro for the building of lighthouses on three islets in the KIG: Nares Reef, Recto Bank or Marie Louise Reef, and Sea Horse Bank.

This was about the time that the Chinese were starting to occupy Mischief Reef in the KIG, which is only 135 nautical miles away from the Philippine baseline. The Philippine government authorities found out about it in February 1995.

Lazaro supported the lighthouses project and sought Ramos’ approval to draw funds from the DOE’s Special Account.

In a memo to Ramos, Lazaro cited possible international complications and risks of the lighthouse project: “While this project will be beneficial to the Philippines in terms of expanding available area not only for petroleum exploration but for other natural resources as well and that the lighthouses will also be important navigational aids, we wish to point out that actual construction of the lighthouse could provoke international protests from other countries (such as China and Vietnam) including possible physical stoppage of the work by their navies.”

Lazaro’s request for a go-signal got stalled in Malacanang. His successor, Francisco Viray, pursued the lighthouse project. In a memo to Ramos dated Dec. 12, 1994, Viray said: “Once established, these lighthouses will serve as legal basis in determining the new baseline. Other countries are doing the same things to fortify their territorial claims.”

Viray said the presence of lighthouses would reinforce the country’s claim over the Reed Bank. A lighthouse would have qualified Reed Bank, which is within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, to be part of the archipelagic baseline.

“The inclusion of the Reed Bank within the baselines will effectively increase our archipelagic waters within the baselines by 11,042 square nautical miles or 7,750,000 hectares. This will mean that we can fully exercise sovereignty over this resource-rich area. It must be noted that the inclusion of this area within the EEZ only does not assure full exploration/exploitation rights. Under UNCLOS, other countries can come in as long as they pay royalties,” Viray said.

Documents showed that on Feb. 15, 1995, Ramos finally approved the release of P178-million for the mapping, survey, and construction of lighthouses in the KIG. He instructed the DOE to supply the funds, and the NAMRIA to supervise the design and construction of the lighthouse as well as the coordinates of the benchmarks identifying the territorial limits based on the 200-nautical mile EEZ. Formal public bidding was waived “in view of the urgency and confidentiality of the project.”

But soon after the funding was approved, Ramos himself revoked the authority of NAMRIA, which is under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to oversee the project and transferred it to the Philippine Navy upon the recommendation of Defense Secretary Renato de Villa.

This led Solis to complain in a June 6, 1995 memo to then Environment Secretary Angel G. Alcala: “The NAMRIA has been religiously working for the immediate implementation of the KIG project. I would like to inform the Executive Secretary that when there were still no available funds for the project, it was the NAMRIA which did all the work to convince the funding agency to support the project. However, when the funding was approved and the authority was given to the NAMRIA, the Cabinet made a decision to transfer the project to the Philippine Navy.”

The KIG lighthouses never got built—and the Philippines has lost its chance to build them.

By the time Solis wrote Alcala, the Chinese garrison was already discovered in Mischief Reef (February 1995). Philippine protest over Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef led to an ASEAN Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which enjoins “ Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”

The Philippines is protesting the building by China of lighthouses in the disputed reefs as a violation of the ASEAN DOC. That’s all that we can do.