PH, China in battle of photos on Scarborough shoal

By Ellen Tordesillas, VERA Files

PH Navy photos, Sept. 2, 2013

PH Navy photos, Sept. 2, 2013

Concrete blocks or just rocks and corals?
Chinese photos taken second week of Sept. 2013

Chinese photos taken second week of Sept. 2013

That is the latest question troubling the strained relationship between the Philippines and China over the disputed Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal, off the South China Sea. This time, though, the dispute is playing out through photographs, more than words.

A week after the Armed Forces of the Philippines came out with photographs showing concrete blocks in Bajo de Masinloc, China released photos that showed only rocks and corals.

The photos sent by China to Philippine officials were said to have been taken second week of September to support the statement issued by China’s Foreign Ministry that the Philippine claim was “fabricated.”


Defense Department Spokesman Peter Paul Galvez and Philippine Navy Spokesperson Lieutenant Commodore Gregory Fabic both declined to comment on China’s photos and referred the matter to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The Philippine Navy, in a monitoring report on Sept 10, found “at least two concrete blocks,” on Bajo de Masinloc, which military officials feared would serve as foundation for future construction.

Navy officials, however, cannot tell from the photos if the concrete blocks were placed there recently or had been there before April 2012.

Navy Chief Vice Adm. Jose Luis Alano earlier said the removal of concrete blocks in the area, currently guarded by at least three Chinese ships, is under discussion.

The concrete blocks in Scarborough shoal, Huangyan Island to the Chinese, are the latest issue in the long-running dispute between the Philippines and China over rock formations 124 nautical miles west of Zambales. These are within the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the country but have been under the control of China since April 2012.

DFA Spokesperson Raul Hernandez skirted the issue saying, “We think that to address the issue, the action to be taken would be to focus on the expeditious conclusion of the legally-binding code of conduct on the SCS and also on our preparation of our memorial for the arbitration case with China.”

He did not reply when asked if the concrete blocks on Scarborough Shoal would be included in the Philippine petition before the United Nations Arbitral Court nor did he provide updates on Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario’s earlier announcement that the Philippines would file a diplomatic protest.

Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin first presented the photos of concrete blocks in Scarborough shoal numbering 75, taken by the Philippine Navy, in a congressional budget hearing last Sept. 3.

Gazmin said the photos, taken on Sept. 2, showed “concrete blocks inside the shoal” which he said “may serve as foundations, platforms, a prelude to construction.” The photos also showed Chinese Coast Guard vessels about 3.2 nautical miles off the shoal’s entrance.

Aside from the concrete blocks, there is a photo showing two vertical posts at north off the shoal’s entrance, which were first seen as early as July this year.

Vertical posts at the entrance of the shoal seen way back July 2013.Sept 2013

Vertical posts at the entrance of the shoal seen way back July 2013.Sept 2013

Immediately after Gazmin’s congressional disclosure, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei said, “No one knows the situation on the Huangyan Island better than China. What the Philippines said was completely fabricated.”

Hong reiterated China’s claim over the shoal. “I would like to underline that China’s activities on the Huangyan Island and in its adjacent waters fall entirely within the scope of China’s sovereignty. China urges the Philippines to stop stirring up new troubles and work together with China to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea and restore bilateral relations,” he said.

Philippines officials fear that the concrete blocks in Scarborough shoal would lead to another “Mischief Reef.”

In February 1995, the Philippines discovered a cluster of huts in Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, 130 nautical miles west of Palawan. It is now a military garrison.

The islands in the Spratlys in the South China Sea are being claimed partly by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei and wholly by China and Taiwan. The 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations is in talks with China for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

The Philippines has questioned before the U.N. Arbitral Court China’s nine-dashed line map which gives the Asian superpower 90 per cent of the vast South China Sea.

More photos from the Philippine Navy of Scarborough shoal:

PH Navy Sept 2, 2013C b3PH Navy Sept 2 2013B Spotted 10 NW off the shoal's entrance

More photos from China on Scarborough shoal:

Chinese photos of SS 2nd week of Sept 2013A Chinese photos of SS 2nd week of Sept 2013B Chinese photos of SS end week of Sept 2013D

(VERA Files is put out by veteran journalists taking a deeper look at current issues. Vera is Latin for “true.”)

A guide to understanding the West Philippine Sea dispute

The Primer

The Primer

The Asian Center of the University of the Philippines has come out with a very useful document: The West Philippine Sea: Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective.

It’s available online: http://philippinesintheworld.org/?q=node/2227 .

Prepared under the direction of experts on the subject (Dean Eduardo T. Gonzalez of the Asian Center; Aileen S. P. Baviera, professor, Asian Center; and Jay Batongbacal, director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea of the UP College of Law), the timing of the primer is perfect as tension in the area continues to simmer.

The authors have succeeded in simplying the complicated topic. It covers history of the conflict and recent events. Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Panatag shoal and by its international name Scarborough Shoal (Chinese name is Huangyan island) which has been the area of conflict since the standoff April last year involving Chinese and the Philippine ships, is well covered.

Understandably, not extensively discussed is the Ayungin Shoal issue which started last month with China complaining about the not removal by the Philippine Navy of the grounded BRP Sierra Madre from the reef some 21 nautical miles away from the Chinese occupied Mischief Reef.

Although as the title states, the primer is from a “Filipino perspective”, the presentation is objective. It enlightens, it does not agitate.

The General Introduction, for example, differentiates West Philippine Sea from South China Sea. This is useful because many journalists interchange the two terms which is wrong.

The Primer says “The West Philippine Sea refers to the part of the South China Sea that is closest, and ofvital interest, to the Philippines…. It includes the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), and Bajo de Masinloc also known as Scarborough Shoal.”

The West Philippine Sea is part of the South China Sea, which the Primer says is “a much broader expanse of water, often described as a semi-enclosed sea, bounded by China/Taiwan in the north, by the Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei in the west and south. The Gulf of Tonkin and Gulf of Thailand also abut the South China Sea. “

“Scattered over the South China Sea are various geographic features, the most prominent of which are known internationally as the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Island. There are overlapping claims by various countries to these features and to the waters and resources surrounding them, including parts of the West Philippine Sea,” the primer says.

How about Kalayaan Island Group which journalists also often interchangeably use to refer to Spratly islands?

The Primer says “The Kalayaan Island Group (is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding waters that belong to the Philippines, located in what is internationally known as the Spratly Islands. The KIG is not the same as the Spratlys, however, as there are features in the Spratlys that are not part of the KIG.”

The authors said the primer is s intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes.

Add “Malacanang officials” to the list who need to read the primer.

A guide to understanding the West Philippine Sea dispute

The Primer

The Primer

The Asian Center of the University of the Philippines has come out with a very useful document: The West Philippine Sea: Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective.

It’s available online: http://philippinesintheworld.org/?q=node/2227 .

Prepared under the direction of experts on the subject (Dean Eduardo T. Gonzalez of the Asian Center; Aileen S. P. Baviera, professor, Asian Center; and Jay Batongbacal, director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea of the UP College of Law), the timing of the primer is perfect as tension in the area continues to simmer.

The authors have succeeded in simplying the complicated topic. It covers history of the conflict and recent events. Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Panatag shoal and by its international name Scarborough Shoal (Chinese name is Huangyan island) which has been the area of conflict since the standoff April last year involving Chinese and the Philippine ships, is well covered.

Understandably, not extensively discussed is the Ayungin Shoal issue which started last month with China complaining about the not removal by the Philippine Navy of the grounded BRP Sierra Madre from the reef some 21 nautical miles away from the Chinese occupied Mischief Reef.

Although as the title states, the primer is from a “Filipino perspective”, the presentation is objective. It enlightens, it does not agitate.

The General Introduction, for example, differentiates West Philippine Sea from South China Sea. This is useful because many journalists interchange the two terms which is wrong.

The Primer says “The West Philippine Sea refers to the part of the South China Sea that is closest, and ofvital interest, to the Philippines…. It includes the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), and Bajo de Masinloc also known as Scarborough Shoal.”

The West Philippine Sea is part of the South China Sea, which the Primer says is “a much broader expanse of water, often described as a semi-enclosed sea, bounded by China/Taiwan in the north, by the Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei in the west and south. The Gulf of Tonkin and Gulf of Thailand also abut the South China Sea. “

“Scattered over the South China Sea are various geographic features, the most prominent of which are known internationally as the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Island. There are overlapping claims by various countries to these features and to the waters and resources surrounding them, including parts of the West Philippine Sea,” the primer says.

How about Kalayaan Island Group which journalists also often interchangeably use to refer to Spratly islands?

The Primer says “The Kalayaan Island Group (is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding waters that belong to the Philippines, located in what is internationally known as the Spratly Islands. The KIG is not the same as the Spratlys, however, as there are features in the Spratlys that are not part of the KIG.”

The authors said the primer is s intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes.

Add “Malacanang officials” to the list who need to read the primer.

China’s occupation of Bajo de Masinloc gave PH no choice but go to U.N.

Two of three Chinese fishing vessels at Bajo de Masinloc

So far, all that Beijing has said of the Philippines’ suit asking the United Nations to declare as illegal its nine-dash-line map is that it “will complicate the issue.”

China reiterated its earlier denunciation of the Philippines’ “illegal occupation” of some islands in the South China Sea, referred to in the Philippines as “West Philippine Sea.”

Sources with contact in Beijing said China’s Foreign Ministry was “stunned” that the Philippines pushed through what they have been talking about for almost two years now.

China is most concerned of its international respectability. This suit, the first against China at the U.N., does not augur well for a new leadership that would come in next month.

China has been consistent in its position not to “internationalize” the issue of conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea and over Bajo de Masinloc (Huangyan Island to the Chinese) and to deal the issue bilaterally.

The Philippines defied China, the emerging world superpower, last Tuesday and decided to ask the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal to declare the nine-dash line map illegal.

China submitted on May 7, 2009 before the U.N. Commission on the Law of the Sea the “nine-dash line” map, so called because instead of coordinates, it shows a series of nine dashes or dotted lines forming a ring around the South China Sea area, which China claims is part of its territory.

The “nine-dash line map” puts 90 percent of the whole South China Sea under Chinese jurisdiction Bajo de Masinloc, 124 nautical miles away from Zambales and clearly within the Philippines 200 NM exclusiove economic zone (it’s 467 nautical miles from mainland China) and Spratlys group of islands which are also claimed wholly and partly by the Philippines,Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

The DFA said it is not the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea or ITLOS that the Philippine lodged its suit. It is before the Arbitral Tribunal under Article 287 and Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS under which it does not need China to agree to the arbitration.

The process has started with the handing by the DFA last Tuesday to Ambassador Ma Keqing of the note verbale on the U.N. suit and a copy of the 19-page Notification and Statement of Claim.

Sources close to Malacanang and the DFA said the tipping point for the Philippines was the declaration by Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Fu Ying later last year that they have no intention of withdrawing their three remaining ships in Bajo de Masinloc which is tantamount to their occupation of a Philippine territory.

In the Philippine Notification and Statement of Claim, it used the word “seize” in describing the Bajo de Masinloc incident:

Paragraph 20 states: “In 2012, China seized six small rocks that protrude above sea level within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, unlawfully claimed an exaggerated maritime zone around these features, and wrongfully prevented the Philippines from navigating, ort enjoying access to the living resources within this zone, even though it forms part of the Philippines’ EEZ.

“These half dozen protrusions, which are known collectively as Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc n the Philippines; Huang Yan Dao in China) are located approximately 120 M west of the the Philippine island of Luzon……”

Paragraph 21 states, “Until April 2012, Philippine fishing vessels routinely fished in this area, which is within the Philippines’ 200 M exclusive economic zone. Since then, China has prevented the Philippines from fishing at Scarborough Shoal or in its vicinity, and undertaken other activities inconsistent with the Convention. Only Chinese vessels are now allowed to fish in these waters, and have harvested, inter alia, endangered species such as sea turtles, sharks and giant clams which are protected by both international and Philippine law.”
China gave the Philippines’ no choice.

Bajo de Masinloc crucial to China’s claim of whole South China Sea

By ELLEN TORDESILLAS, VERA Files
(Conclusion)

Chinese vessel with giant clams taken from Bajo de Masinloc waters

The permanent stationing of three of its ships in Bajo de Masinloc is part of China’s “creeping invasion” of disputed territories in the South China Sea, a high-ranking Philippine government official said.

Bajo de Masinloc is Huangyan island to China, which has time and again reiterated “that Huangyan Island and Nansha Islands have always been parts of Chinese territory and that the People’s Republic of China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent waters.”

“The claim to territory sovereignty over Huangyan Island and Nansha Islands by the Philippines is illegal and invalid,” China says.

Nansha is what the Chinese call the Spratly Islands, a group of islands on the South China Sea, parts of which are being claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

China’s presence on Bajo de Masinloc is also an alarming reminder to the Philippines of how Mischief Reef came under Chinese control 18 years ago.

In the early 1990s, China had built structures it said were just fishermen’s shelters on Mischief Reef. Through the years, China added installations on the island, including a radar system.

Philippine and U.S Air Force reconnaissance revealed military structures on Mischief Reef belying Chinese claims. In January 1995, the captain of a Philippine fishing boat reported that he was arrested and detained for a week by the Chinese when he ventured into Mischief Reef.

Since then Mischief Reef has been under the control of China and inaccessible to Filipinos.

A paper titled “Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal” written by Francois-Xavier Bonnet of the Bangkok-based Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC) explains the importance of Huangyan Island to the bigger and long-term objective of China.

Bonnet said Huangyan Island/Bajo de Masinloc is crucial to China’s claim over the Zhongsha Qundao islands which is vital in its controversial “nine-dash line map.”

A map without coordinates. Thanks to Yahoo.

The map is called “nine-dash line” or “nine-dotted line” because it shows a series of nine dashes or dotted lines forming a ring around the South China Sea area, which China claims is part of its territory. The area includes the Spratlys group and Bajo de Masinloc.

The “nine-dash line map” puts 90 percent of the whole South China Sea under Chinese jurisdiction.

The map does not have coordinates, but was submitted by China to the United Nations on May 7, 2009.

verafiles-9dashBonnet explained, “The Zhongsha Qundao is composed of Macclesfield Bank, Truro Shoal, Saint Esprit Shoal, Dreyer Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. All these banks and shoals, except for Scarborough Shoal, are under several meters of water even during low tide. Chinese policymakers know too well that without Huangyan island, the chance of their ownership over Zhongsha Qundao recognized is nil.”

Bonnet said, “The stakes are high. If China loses Huangyan/Scarborough, it will lose Zhongsha Qundao, which could be divided by the EEZs of the neighboring countries or placed under the regime of the high seas. By consequence, China’s entire claim to the South China Sea supported by the U-shape line would be moot and academic.”

Last June, China elicited international concern when it established Sansha City on Yongxing Island in the southernmost province of Hainan. Sansha City’s territory includes the Spratlys, the Paracels and Macclesfield Bank.

Immediately after establishing Sansha City, China’s Central Military Commission, its most powerful military body, approved the deployment of a garrison of soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army to guard disputed islands.

China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs said in June that putting Macclesfield Bank, the Paracels and the Spratlys under Sansha would “further strengthen China’s administration and development” of the three island groups.

The Philippines protested the establishment of Sansha City, specifically the inclusion of a part of its territory, Macclesfield Bank, one of the largest underwater atolls in the world, covering an area of 6,500 square kilometers.

Former foreign undersecretary and Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations Lauro Baja said there is no doubt that China has Bajo de Masinloc in its long-term territorial design.

Incidents of Philippine Navy ships apprehending Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Bajo de Masinloc is common. In 1999, the Philippine Navy even “accidentally” sank a Chinese fishing boat. But the conflict never went beyond the standard diplomatic protests.

Former Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon recalled one apprehension in 1998 that was a subject of a diplomatic protest by China involving a young navy officer named Antonio Trillanes IV, who would would later on become a senator and play a controversial role in the tension between the Philippines and China over the disputed shoal.

But Philippine encounters with the Chinese in Baja de Masinloc took a different turn on April 8, 2012, when the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, the Philippines lone modern warship acquired from the United States, arrested Chinese fishing vessels in the area.

Philippine military officials said BRP Gregorio del Pilar was due for preventive maintenance servicing in Subic at that time but was redirected to Northern Luzon as contingency undertaking for an impending North Korea rocket launch.

The combat ship was also ordered to verify reports about the presence of the Chinese fishing vessels in Bajo de Masinloc. They arrested Chinese fishermen in eight fishing boats caught with sizable quantities of endangered marine species, corals, live sharks and giant clams.

Looking back, officials say the April 8, 2012 incident gave China an excuse to occupy the area.

China immediately deployed three Chinese Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships to Bajo de Masinloc to rescue their fishermen and added more than 80 vessels as the standoff dragged on.

The Philippines later withdrew BRP Gregorio del Pilar, which was replaced by a Philippine Coast Guard ship and a research vessel by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources in observance of “white to white,” referring to civilian ships, and “gray to gray,” meaning navy-to-navy rules of engagement.

The standoff that lasted 57 days spilled over to the economic front with China rejecting inferior quality bananas from the Philippines and cancellation of Philippine-bound Chinese tour groups.

It was only broken upon the insistence of the United States State Department that the issue be resolved because President Barack Obama did not want it included in the agenda of his June 8, 2012 meeting with President Benigno Aquino III at the White House.

With the breakdown of communication between the straight-talking Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario and Chinese Ambassador Ma Keqing in Manila, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell proposed to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying in Washington D.C. that Chinese and Philippine vessels withdraw simultaneously from the disputed shoal.

By that time, Trillanes had entered the picture and was directly negotiating between Beijing and Malacañang to help de-escalate the tension.

Hours before Aquino left for London and Washington D.C. on June 4, 2012, Malacañang announced the pullout of Philippine ships from Bajo de Masinloc “consistent with our agreement with the Chinese government on withdrawal of all vessels from the shoal’s lagoon to defuse the tensions in the area.”

Diplomatic sources said Fu Ying never committed complete withdrawal of their ships from Bajo de Masinloc as there was resistance from the People’s Liberation Army, an important sector in China’s power structure.

Del Rosario said when he met with Fu Ying during her Manila visit last Oct. 19, “I was very direct in saying that the presence of their ships is in clear violation of our sovereign rights, and they must withdraw their ships at the earliest possible time.”

Fu Ying did not respond, he said.